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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
V.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue 1: Whether a release from liability arising
from an automobile accident that identifies by name the
automobile's insured who was not involved in the
accident applies to the driver of the automobile whose
name does not appear in the Release.

Preserved in

Record at 36-37, 91-100.
Issue 2: Whether a release from liability arising
from an automobile accident that identifies by names
the automobile's insured who was not involved in the
accident is ambiguous as it relates to the automobile's
driver whose name does not appear in the Release; and,
if so, whether an issue of material fact prevents
summary enforcement of the Release.

Preserved in

Record at 95-9 6.
Standard of Review:

"Generally, a trial court's

summary enforcement of a settlement agreement will not
be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was
an abuse of discretion."

John Deere Co. v. A & H

Eguipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.)

1

(internal quotations & citations omitted), cert.
denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994).

"In addition,

whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question
of law, also reviewed for correctness."

Id.

This

Court will affirm "a trial court's grant of a motion
for summary judgment on any reasonable legal basis even
if not relied on below."

Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l

Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). (emphasis added).
The Court, however, will not reverse a trial court
based on evidence or an argument that was not first
raised with the trial court.

Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc.

v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993).
VI.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

There are no determinative constitutional
provisions, statutory provisions, ordinances, rules or
regulations.

Thornock has identified Utah Code Ann. §

78-27-42 as determinative, but does not rely on that
section in any of her arguments.

We disagree with

Thornock's characterization of section 78-27-42 for the
reasons set forth in our Argument section below.
VII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident on
November 15, 1993 between appellant Bonnie Thornock and
2

appellee Dorothy Jensen.

Record at 1-2, 23. The

accident occurred at the intersection of 9000 South and
Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah.

Record at 1-2, 26,

35.
At the time of the accident, Dorothy Jensen was
driving a car insured through an insurance policy
issued in the name of her husband, Lowell Jensen.
Record at 23, 48. After the accident, Mr. Lancaster, a
claims adjuster for the insurance company met with Ms.
Thornock to discuss her claims against Dorothy Jensen.
Record at 24, 48.

In exchange for $469.00, Ms.

Thornock executed a Release of All Claims ("Release")
which is the subject of this appeal.

Record at 24-26,

48-49.
Lowell Jensen's name appears in the Release.
Record at 26. The Release does not refer to Dorothy
Jensen by name.
B.

Record at 26.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

In February 1996, Ms. Thornock filed suit against
Dorothy Jensen seeking recovery for personal injuries
sustained in the November 15, 1993 accident.
4.

Record at

Ms. Jensen filed a timely Answer and subsequently

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Ms.
Thornock released Ms. Jensen from all liability
3

relating to the accident when Ms. Thornock executed the
Release.

Record at 10-12, 16-26.

Ms. Jensen submitted

the Affidavit of Jim Lancaster and Supplemental
Affidavit of Jim Lancaster in support of her motion.
Record at 23-25, 47-49.

These affidavits are

reproduced in the attached Addendum.
Ms. Thornock opposed the motion for summary
judgment arguing that the Release cannot apply to
Dorothy Jensen because her name does not appear in the
Release.

Record at 35-37.

At oral argument, Ms.

Thornock added that the Release was ambiguous and that
Ms. Thornock's affidavit created an issue of fact
regarding the ambiguity.

Record at 95-96.

In her affidavit, Ms. Thornock claims that she was
under medication when she signed the Release and that
the Release she signed was blank.1

Record at 57.

(Ms.

Thornock's affidavit is reproduced in the attached
Addendum).

Because Ms. Thornockfs affidavit was filed

the night before oral argument, counsel for Ms. Jensen
objected at oral argument to what he perceived to be a
last minute attempt to infuse issues of competency into
1

We are not certain what Ms. Thornock means by
"blank" and because this was never an issue below, the
term was never clarified. We assume Ms. Thornock means
a release in which the blanks were not yet filled in.
4

the case.

Record at 90-91.

Counsel for Thornock

reassured counsel and the Court that the only reason he
submitted Ms. Thornockfs affidavit was to demonstrate
that Ms. Thornock did not intend to release anyone.
Record at 91.

No argument was made that Ms. Thornock

was incompetent at the time that she signed the Release
or that Mr. Lancaster tricked Ms. Thornock into signing
the Release.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

The trial court found that the Release is not
ambiguous and the parties intended the Release to apply
to Ms. Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen.
Record at 69-71, 105.

The trial court also found there

was no evidence that Lowell Jensen had any liability to
Ms. Thornock.

Record at 7 0, 105.

The Summary Judgment

order is included in the Addendum to Brief of
Appellant.
D.

FACTS RELATED TO THE ISSUES ON REVIEW

On November 15, 199 3, Ms. Thornock and Dorothy
Jensen were involved in a motor vehicle accident at the
intersection of 9000 South and Redwood Road in West
Jordan, Utah.

Record at 1-2, 26, 35.

Dorothy Jensen

was driving a car insured through an insurance policy
issued in the name of Lowell Jensen.
5

Record at 23, 48.

Lowell Jensen is Dorothy Jensen's husband.
23, 48.

Record at

Lowell Jensen was not present at the scene of

the accident and was not involved in the automobile
accident.

Record at 23, 48.

On November 30, 1993, Thornock met with a claims
adjuster named Jim Lancaster to discuss the accident.
Record at 24, 48.

Mr. Lancaster and Ms. Thornock

agreed that the insurance company would pay Ms.
Thornock $469.00 for out-of-pocket expenses, pain and
suffering in exchange for a Release.

Record at 24-26,

The Release provides in relevant part:
[T]he undersigned . . . for and in
consideration of Four Hundred and Sixty-Nine
& 00/00 Dollars ($469.00) to the undersigned
in hand paid, and other good and valuable
consideration . , . does hereby . . .
release, acguit and forever discharge Lowell
Jensen and his, her, their, or its agents,
servants, successors, heirs, executors,
administrators and all other persons . . . of
an[d] from any and all claims, actions,
causes of action, demands, rights, damages,
costs, loss of service, expenses, and
compensation whatsoever, which the
undersigned now has/have or which may
hereafter accrue on account of or in any way
growing out of any and all known and unknown,
foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal
injuries and property damage and the
consequences thereof resulting or to result
from the accident, casualty or event which
occurred on or about the 15th day of Nov.,
199.3, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.[,]
West Jordan, Ut.
6

The undersigned specifically agrees that this
Release of All Claims releases all
individuals, corporations, firms,
associations or partnerships which allegedly
could be liable for the above-references
accident, casualty or event. It is the
specific intention of the undersigned to
release all parties who could be liable for
the same.
Record at 30 (underlined portions hand-written in
original).
Thornock admits to signing the Release, although
she claims it was blank at time.2

Record at 57.

She

also admits that Mr. Lancaster came to her home to
discuss damages from the accident with Dorothy Jensen.
Record at 56.

Thornock, however, claims that she

"never intended to release anyone."
VIII.

Record at 57.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Ms. Thornock alludes to several issues not raised
below.

Issues relating to incompetence, mistake or

fraud were not raised below, and in the case of fraud
and mistake, were not pleaded with particularity.
These issues are not before the Court.
2

The issues

Appellant states that we never disputed that
Ms. Thornock signed a "blank" release. Appellant's
statement in unfair and inaccurate. Appellee never
took issue with this statement below because it was
never emphasized by appellant below. Appellant never
argued that Mr. Lancaster tricked her into signing the
Release. This statement was irrelevant to the
arguments made by both parties.
7

before this Court are whether the Release applies to
Dorothy Jensen even though her name does not appear in
the Release, or in the alternative, whether the Release
is ambiguous, and if so, whether there is a question of
fact regarding the ambiguity.
A.

MS. THORNOCK RELEASED DOROTHY JENSEN

Ms. Thornock argues that the holding in Child v.
Newsom, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995) and that Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-42 apply to the Release in this case.

Child

and section 78-27-42 carve out an exception to the
common law with respect to releases involving multiple
tortfeasors.

They provide that a release obtained in a

multiple tortfeasor case must either name the party
being released or identify the party with some degree
of specificity.

Child, 892 P.2d at 12.

Because this is not a multiple tortfeasor case,
the exception in Child and section 78-27-42 does not
apply here.

Rather the common law applies.

The

unambiguous terms of the Release are that it applies to
Lowell Jensen, his heirs, and "all individuals . . .
which allegedly could be liable for the abovereferenced accident."

Record at 30.

Obviously,

Dorothy Jensen is Lowell Jensen's heir.

8

Furthermore,

Dorothy Jensen is the only person that could be liable
to Mr. Thornock for the accident.
The Release applies to all persons potentially
liable for the accident.

There is only one person who

fits this description in this case and that person is
Dorothy Jensen.

Lowell Jensen was not present at the

accident and was not involved in the accident.

Lowell

Jensen's only connection to the accident was that his
wife was involved in the accident and she was driving a
car which carried insurance issued in his name.
Therefore, the reference in the Release to persons
liable can only mean Dorothy Jensen.
Alternatively, Dorothy Jensen is a third-party
beneficiary of the Release.

As noted above, the

Release identifies Lowell Jensen's heirs and the
individual allegedly responsible for the accident as a
beneficiary of the Release.

Ms. Jensen is the only

person to which this language could refer.

Therefore,

she is the specific intended beneficiary of the
Release.
Finally, even if the Court were to expand the
exception created by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 and
Child to single tortfeasor cases, the Release in this
case still would apply to Dorothy Jensen.

9

The language

of the Release is sufficient to identify Dorothy Jensen
with "some degree of specificity" as required in Child.
Child, 892 P.2d at 12.
B.

EVEN IF AMBIGUOUS, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THORNOCK INTENDED TO RELEASE DOROTHY JENSEN

Even if the Court were to find that the Release is
ambiguous, there is no issue of material fact regarding
the parties' intent.

The alleged ambiguity here is

whether the parties intended the Release naming Lowell
Jensen to include Dorothy Jensen who was the only
person involved in the accident.

Ms. Thornock does not

argue that she intended to release Lowell Jensen and
not Dorothy Jensen.

She argues that although she

signed the Release, she never intended to release
anyone.
Ms. Thornock's testimony does not make sense.

By

signing the Release she intended to release someone.
The Release is unambiguous in that it is a Release.
Furthermore, this testimony does not relate to the
ambiguity at issue.

An ambiguous term in a contract

does not make all other unambiguous language subject to
attack from parole evidence.
The only evidence in the record about the alleged
ambiguity at issue was that Mr. Lancaster went to Ms.
10

Thornock's home to discuss Ms. Thornock's claims
against Dorothy Jensen.

During that meeting, Ms.

Thornock signed a Release of liability for claims
arising from the accident.

The parties intended the

Release to apply to Ms. Thornock's claims against
Dorothy Jensen.
IX.

ARGUMENT

Initially, the Court should be aware of the issues
alluded to in Ms. Thornock's brief that were not raised
below and therefore are not before this Court.

For the

first time in this case, Thornock now argues that she
"may have made the mistake of relying upon Lancaster's
words, and signing something which she did not really
intend."3 Appellate Brief at 11.
argued or pleaded below.

Mistake was not

n

[I]n all averments of . . .

mistake, the circumstances constituting . . . mistake
shall be stated with particularity."
9(b).

Utah R. Civ. P.

Mistake was not pleaded at all, let alone with

particularity.

3

Ms. Thornock's argument is misguided because
"[t]o permit a party . . .
to admit that he signed [a
contract] but to deny that it expresses the agreement
he made . . . would absolutely destroy the value of all
contracts." Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings,
Inc., 234 P.2d 842, 844 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted).
11

Likewise, Ms• Thornock implies that she was
defrauded into signing the Release.
argued below.

Fraud was not

And fraud, like mistake, must be pleaded

with particularity,

id.

Fraud was never pleaded.

Below, Ms. Thornock argued that the Release did
not apply to Dorothy Jensen because her name did not
appear in the Release or, in the alternative, that the
Release was ambiguous resulting in a guestion of fact.
Record at 36-37, 91-100.

These are the only issues

that Ms. Thornock preserved for review.
Turning to the Release at issue, "it is still
axiomatic in contract law that '[p]ersons dealing at
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own
terms without the intervention of the courts for the
purpose of relieving one side or the other from the
effects of a bad bargain.'"

Bekins Bar V Ranch v.

Huth, 664 P.2d 445, 459 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted).
Contracting parties "'should be permitted to enter into
contracts that . . . may lead to hardship on one
side.'"

Id.

"[I]t is not for the court to assume the

paternalistic role of declaring that one who has freely
bound himself need not perform because the bargain is
not favorable."

Id.

12

In addition,

"*[i]t is a basic rule that the law

favors settlement of disputes.

Such agreements under

the proper circumstances may be summarily enforced.'"
John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883 (citation omitted).
"An agreement of compromise and settlement constitutes
an executory accord.

Since an executory accord

constitutes a valid enforceable contract, basic
contract principles affect the determination of when a
settlement agreement should be enforced."

Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

See also

Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 753
(Utah 1982) (releases are treated just like any other
contracts under Utah law). The Release at issue was a
valid contract releasing Dorothy Jensen.
A.

MS. THORNOCK RELEASED DOROTHY JENSEN

Ms. Thornock identifies Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42
as a "DETERMINATIVE STATUTE" in Section VI of her
brief, but does not refer to the statute in her
argument.

Rather, she relies entirely on Child v.

Newsom, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995), a Utah Supreme Court
decision interpreting section 78-27-42.

Neither

section 78-27-42 nor Child is relevant to the Release
in this case.

13

Section 78-27-42 provides:
A release given by a person seeking recovery
to one or more defendants does not discharge
any other defendant unless the release so
provides.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 (emphasis added).

The plain

language of section 78-27-42 contemplates a multiple
tortfeasor situation involving a defendant or group of
defendants negotiating a release on the one hand and
"any other defendant" on the other hand.4

The statute

provides that a release obtained by one defendant or
group of defendants does not discharge other
defendants.

Thus, section 78-27-42 applies only in

multiple tortfeasor cases.
Section 78-27-42 does not apply here because this
is not a multiple tortfeasor case.
the only defendant.

Dorothy Jensen is

She is the only person from whom

Ms. Thornock was seeking recovery and the only
defendant from whom she could seek recovery, when Mr.
Lancaster went to Ms. Thornock's home and when Ms.
Thornock signed the Release.
4

Because this is not a

The term "defendant" is defined in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-37 as "any person not immune from suit who
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person
seeking recovery." The trial court found that Lowell
Jensen could not be a defendant because there is no
basis for liability between Ms. Thornock and Mr.
Jensen. Record at 70, 105.
14

multiple tortfeasor case, section 78-27-47 has no
bearing on the Release.
For the same reasons that section 78-27-47 does
not apply here, the holding in Child v. Newsom also is
inapposite.

892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995).

In Child, Melinda

Child, a minor, was killed in an automobile accident.
Id. at 9-10.

Child had been a passenger in a vehicle

driven by Jesse Deller who also was a minor.

The

Deller vehicle had been hit by an oncoming car driven
by Newsom.

Child had a claim against both Deller and

Newsom.
Child's father settled with the Dellers and
executed a release.5

id.

After settling with Dellers,

Child's father filed a wrongful death action against
Newsom, the driver of the oncoming car.

id.

Newsom

sought and obtained summary judgment on grounds that
the release between Child and Deller also applied to
Newsom.
5

Ms. Thornock points out that the release in
Child also named the driver's parents from which she
extrapolates that if the minor driver's parents were
potential defendants in Child, Lowell Jensen must be a
potential defendant in this case. Ms. Thornock's logic
is flawed. Both Lowell and Dorothy Jensen are
emancipated adults. The is no issue of negligent
entrustment here. Furthermore, just because the
Release named the parents does not mean that the
plaintiff was seeking recovery from the parents.
15

Initially, the Utah Supreme Court determined that
section 78-27-42 applied to the release because Newsom
fell within the definition of "any other defendant" in
the statute.

Id. at 10.

Because section 78-27-42

applied, the court determined that the common law rules
of contract construction did not apply.

Instead, the

court would construe the language of the Release
narrowly because:
Holding otherwise would necessarily run
contrary to the statute's purpose by allowing
general release language which does not name
or specially identify a particular tortfeasor to discharge that tort-feasor. Such
an approach would effectively perpetuate the
common law by permitting boilerplate language
in a release discharging one tort-feasor to
discharge all other tort-feasors in direct
opposition to the very statute that was
enacted to prevent this from occurring.
Id.

The court held that a release obtained by one

tortfeasor does not release another tortfeasor unless
the other tortfeasor is identified in the release by
name or with some degree of specificity. Id.
Ms. Thornock wants this Court to apply these same
special standards of contract construction to the
Release in this case.

For section 78-27-42 to apply

here, however, Ms. Thornock must prove that Lowell
Jensen was the only defendant from whom she was seeking
recovery when Mr. Lancaster went to her home and
16

obtained the Release and that Dorothy Jensen is another
defendant from whom Ms. Thornock was not seeking
recovery at that time.

Nothing could be further from

the truth.
First, Ms. Thornock was not seeking recovery from
Lowell Jensen.
accident.

Lowell Jensen was not involved in the

In her affidavit, Ms. Thornock refers only

to Dorothy Jensen.

She states that "after the accident

with Dorothy Jensen, Jim Lancaster came to my
home . . . "

Record at 56.

When she signed the

Release, Ms. Thornock was seeking recovery from Dorothy
Jensen.
Second, Lowell Jensen is not a defendant under the
statute.

A "defendant" is "any person not immune from

suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to
any person seeking recovery."
37.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-

There has never been any claim in this case that

at the time Ms. Thornock signed the Release she

17

believed Lowell Jensen to be at fault.6

Indeed, there

is no basis for any liability between Lowell Jensen and
Ms. Thornock.

There is only one defendant in this

case, Dorothy Jensen.
Third, the policy behind section 78-27-42 has no
application in single tortfeasor case like this one*
"The statute was designed to retain liability of tortfeasors and reverse the common law rule 'so that
release of one joint tort-feasor did not automatically
release all tort-feasors.'"

Child, 892 P.2d at 11.

Thus, the statute protects the plaintiff in multiple
tortfeasor cases from inadvertently releasing a
tortfeasor she did contemplate releasing.

This

reasoning does not apply in a single tortfeasor case
like this one.
Because the Release at issue is not governed by
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 or Child, it is governed by
common law.

The same common law that according to the

6

Without any legal or factual basis whatsoever,
and for the first time in this case, appellant takes
the position that "Here, Mr. Jensen, as an owner of the
vehicle driven by his wife, had at lease [sic] some
exposure to liability." Appellant Brief at 17
(emphasis in original). As stated in the trial court's
order, "there is no grounds for any liability between
Bonnie Thornock and Lowell Jensen." Record at 64.
Furthermore, Ms. Thornock offered no evidence that she
was seeking recovery from anyone but Dorothy Jensen.
18

Utah Supreme Court in Child allows "general release
language which does not name or specially identify a
particular tort-feasor to discharge that tort-feasor."
Id. at 11.

The common law is that "[w]hen the intent

to relieve a party from liability for alleged
negligence is clearly and unequivocally expressed in a
contractual provision, we will enforce that provision."
Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah
App. 1995).
The Release clearly and unequivocally expresses an
intent to relieve Dorothy Jensen of liability.

Dorothy

Jensen falls unambiguously within the language of the
Release because she is the only individual who
"allegedly could be liable for the . . . accident."
Record at 30.

There is no other reasonable

interpretation of this language in the Release.
Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co.,
899 P.2d 766, 772 (Utah 1995) (Ambiguity is
demonstrated by contrary reasonable interpretations of
the suspect language.).

The Release extends to Ms.

Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen in this case.

19

At a minimum, Dorothy Jensen is an intended thirdparty beneficiary of the Release.7

Palmer v. Davisf

808 P.2d 128 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991).

In Palmer, a minor was run over by a

truck while working on a farm.

Id. at 129.

The minor

settled his claims against his employer and entered
into a release with language nearly identical to that
in this case:
The undersigned . . . does by these presents
release, acquit and forever discharge William
Borders, Kannarra Partnership, its individual
partners, Manza, Inc., its officers and
directors, Keith Schrenk, Justin Anderson,
National Farmers Union Property and Casualty
Company, their agents, servants, employees,
administrators, successors and assigns . . .
from any and all liabilities, claims,
demands, causes of action and damages related
to or associated with that certain incident
that occurred on or about July 15, 1985, on a
farm owned by Kannarra Partnership and Manza,
Inc
Id. at 129.
Subsequently, the minor filed suit against Davis
who was not specially named as one of the parties
released.

Nevertheless, the trial court determined on

summary judgment that the release applied to Davis.

7

Although not raised below, "this Court will
affirm" a trial court's grant of a motion for summary
judgment on any reasonable legal basis even if not
relied on below." Hill, 827 P.2d at 246.
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On

appeal, this Court rejected the argument that "Davis
was not a party to the release and, therefore, cannot
enforce the Release."

id. at 131.

Davis responded,

and the Utah Court of Appeals agreed, that Davis was a
third-party beneficiary of the release.

Id.

The court explained that only "intended
beneficiaries" can enforce a contract as a third-party
beneficiary.

Id.

Whether a beneficiary was intended

"must be clear and is to be determined from the terms
of the contract as well as the surrounding
circumstances."

Id.

The court focused on the phrase

"agents, servants [and] employees" in the general
release language and found that these terms were
sufficiently clear to refer to Davis who was an
employee of one of the named parties.

Id.

Like the release in Palmer, the Release in this
case identifies Dorothy Jensen as a beneficiary of the
Release.

Ms. Jensen is an heir of her husband.

Code Ann. §§ 75-2-101 to -103, 78-11-65.

Utah

And even more

specifically, she is the only person that could be
"liable for the above-referenced accident."
30.

Record at

The phrase referring to "all individuals . . .

which allegedly could be liable for the abovereferenced accident" can have only one meaning in this
21

case, Dorothy Jensen.

Record at 30.

If nothing else,

Dorothy Jensen was an intended third-party beneficiary
of the Release.
The Palmer case also illustrates that even if this
Court were to apply the standards in Child to this
case, the Release language identifies Dorothy Jensen
with sufficient specificity.

Child held that a release

governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 applies to
tortfeasors either named in the Release or identified
in the release with "some degree of specificity."
Child, 892 P.2d at 12.

Certainly, language sufficient

to identify an intended third-party beneficiary
satisfies the some-degree-of-specificity requirement in
Child.
The Release applies to Lowell Jensen, his heirs,
and all persons liable for the accident that occurred
at 90th South and Redwood Road on November 15, 19 93.
Unlike the release in Child which involved multiple
tortfeasors, in this case, this language can only mean
one person, Dorothy Jensen.

Although Dorothy Jensen's

name does not appear in the Release, she is
unambiguously identified in the Release and is entitled
to enforce the Release.
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B.

EVEN IF AMBIGUOUS, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THORNOCK INTENDED TO RELEASE DOROTHY JENSEN

"A contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous
because the parties differ in their interpretation of
its language."

Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer

Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 772 (Utah 1995).

However,

even if the Release were ambiguous, all extrinsic
evidence supports summary judgment enforcement of the
Release.

Ms. Thornock argues that the Release is

ambiguous because Lowell Jensen is named in the Release
and not his wife Dorothy Jensen.

According to Ms.

Thornock, when Dorothy Jensen claimed that the Release
applied to her, the Release became ambiguous and a
finding of ambiguity automatically defeats summary
judgment.
Ambiguity, however, does not automatically
preclude summary judgment and certainly does not
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preclude summary judgment in this case.8

"Even where

some ambiguity exists in the contract, resolution of
the ambiguity is still a question of law for the court,
unless contradictory evidence is presented to clarify
the ambiguity."

Overson v. United States Fidelity &

Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978) (citation

8

Ms. Thornock also claims that in Simonson v.
Travis f the Utah Supreme Court held that ambiguous
releases are invalid. 728 P.2d 999 (Utah 1986)
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting). Ms. Thornock did not
raise this issue below and therefore waived it.
Furthermore, Simonson does not hold that ambiguous
releases are invalid.
In Simonson, the court found the release to be
ambiguous so it examined parole evidence. Id. at 1001.
It found that the parole evidence did not clarify the
ambiguity, so it construed the ambiguity against the
drafter of the release. Id.
Justice Zimmerman dissented because he thought the
Supreme Court had second guessed the fact finder
because he believed there was evidence to support the
trial court's decision. Id. at 1003 (Zimmerman, J.
dissenting). He explained:
Here, the release was ambiguous and,
therefore, parole evidence was properly
considered in determining the intent of the
parties. Ambiguity, however, does not equate
with invalidity.
Id. In short, "[a] release is a type of contract and
may generally be enforced or rescinded on the same
grounds as other contracts." Horgan, 657 P.2d at 753.
In this case, even if ambiguous, the parole
evidence offers only one reasonable interpretation.
The parties released Dorothy Jensen.
24

omitted).

Although Ms. Thornock argued that the

Release was ambiguous, she did not offer any
contradictory evidence to clarify the alleged ambiguity
she purports to rely upon.
"To demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions
must each be a reasonable interpretation of the terms
in the provision."

Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 772.

The alleged ambiguity here is whether the parties
intended the Release that named the non-tortfeasor
insured to include the driver tortfeasor.

Thornock

does not claim that she intended to release Lowell
Jensen and not Dorothy Jensen.

She claims that she did

not want to release anyone.
Ms. Thornock's affidavit testimony that she did
not intend to release anybody is both unreliable and
irrelevant.

The evidence is unreliable because it

hopelessly conflicts with the uncontroverted existence
of the Release which Ms. Thornock admits signing.

This

Court does not consider evidence that is "'clearly
contrary to some immutable law of physics or is
hopelessly in conflict with one or more established and
uncontroverted physical facts.'"

State v. Workmanf 852

P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
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Ms. Thornock's signature on the Release
establishes that she intended to release someone.

She

cannot undue her signature through her affidavit.

"[A]

party is bound by the contract which he or she
voluntarily and knowingly signs."

John Call

Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205,
1208 (Utah 1987).

"To permit a party, . . . to admit

that he signed [a contract] but to deny that it
expresses the agreement he made . . . would absolutely
destroy the value of all contracts."

Garff Realty Co.r

234 P.2d at 844 (citation omitted).
The uncontroverted physical facts are that Ms.
Thornock signed a Release through which she intended to
release someone for the accident allegedly caused by
Dorothy Jensen.

Because there is no evidence of any

other potentially liable "someone", the someone Dorothy
Jensen intended to release is Dorothy Jensen.
In addition, Ms. Thornock's "parole evidence" is
irrelevant because it offers no clarification of the
alleged ambiguity at issue.

The alleged ambiguity is

not whether the Release exists.
Ms. Thornock signed it.

The Release exists and

The alleged ambiguity

supposedly raises the issue of whether the Release
applies to Dorothy Jensen.

This issue does not open
26

the door to parole evidence attacking the very
existence of the Release in the first place.

Because,

Ms. Thornock's affidavit offers no clarification of the
alleged ambiguity, her affidavit testimony is
irrelevant.
The only relevant and competent evidence before
the trial court about the alleged ambiguity was that
Jim Lancaster went to Ms. Thornock's house to discuss
her claims against Dorothy Jensen.

In exchange for

$469.00, Ms. Thornock signed the Release understanding
that it applied to Dorothy Jensen.

Even if ambiguous,

Ms. Thornock produced no evidence to support another
reasonable interpretation.

The uncontroverted evidence

shows only that the parties intended the Release to
apply to Ms. Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen.
X-

CONCLUSION

Whether the trial court's ruling on ambiguity was
correct or not, its conclusion that the Release applied
to Dorothy Jensen was correct, and therefore,

Appellee

Dorothy Jensen respectfully requests that this Court
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affirm the trial court below.
DATED this >^>

day of March, 1997.
STRONG & HANNI

J/oO/I/farw^
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER
KENNETH W. MAXWELL
Attorneys for Appellee

28

XI,

ADDENDUM

Affidavit of Jim Lancaster
Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster
Affidavit of Bonnie Thornock

29

r

-

r ~

->

n

•

r •

i

*

LY.

Stephen J. Trayner, #4928
Kenneth W. Maxwell, #6609
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BONNIE THORNOCK,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JIM
LANCASTER

vs.
Civil No. 960901305-PI
DOROTHY JENSEN,
Judge David S. Young
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
: ss.
)

I, Jim Lancaster, having been sworn upon oath, depose as testify as follows:
1.

I am a Resident Casualty Claims Adjustor for Windsor Insurance Group.

2.

In November 1993, Dorothy Jensen, the wife of Lowell Jensen, was involved in

a motor vehicle accident with Bonnie Thornock. The accident occurred at the intersection of
90th South and Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah.
3.

The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured with Windsor.

0 *) 0 ^ n ~

4.

I contacted Ms. Thornock on November 17, 1993 and met with her that day to

obtain consent forms to retrieve medical records.
5.

On November 30, 1993,1 had a second conversation with Ms. Thornock in which

we discussed settlement of her claim.
6.

We agreed that Windsor would pay $169.00 for Ms. Thornock's broken eye

glasses and $300.00 for out-of-pockets expenses, pain and suffering.
7.

In exchange for the money, Ms. Thornock agreed to and did sign the Release of

All Claims ("Release"), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1. I explained
to Ms. Thornock that the Release was a full release of all her claims arising out of the
November 15 accident.
8.

The Release had a notation that it would not affect the subrogation rights of her

insurance carrier.
9.

By the Release, in consideration of $469.00, Ms. Thornock

forever discharge[d] Lowell Jensen . . . and all other persons . . . of an[d] from
any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs,
loss of service, expenses, and compensation whatsoever, which [Ms. Thornock]
now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way
growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily
and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences thereof resulting
or to result from the accident, casualty or even which occurred on or about the
15th day of Nov., 1993, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.[,] West Jordan,
Ut.
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10.

By the Release, Ms. Thornock "specifically . . . releases all individuals . . .

which allegedly could be liable for the . . . accident, casualty or event." Her specific intention
was "to release all parties who could be liable for the [accident]."
11.

Ms. Thornock certified when she executed the Release that she understood that

the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive and that recovery
therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making the Release, it is understood
and agree[d] that [Ms. Thornock] relies wholly upon [her] judgement, belief and
knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability
therefore and [the Release] is made without reliance upon any statement or
representation of the party or parties hereby released or their representatives or
by any physician or surgeon by them employed.
12.

Ms. Thornock signed the Release in my presence.

DATED this JK_ day of April, 1996

Lancaster

Subscribed and sworn before me on this lh^ day of April, 1996.

TioS^PtiS""
juuic OOURLEY

i

Salt Lake Cfty.Ut^i 84111
Myy Commission Expires
Novembe« 1.1993
State of Utah

.
'
i
j
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Notarv Public
nfoiary ruDiic
^
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RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
Know all men by these presents:
That the undersigned, being of lawful age, for and in consideration of
to the undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby
and for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge

and his, her their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associations
or partnerships of an from any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses, and
compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of
any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences thereof
resulting or to result from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the
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at or near
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The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All claims releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or
partnerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same.
It is understood and agreed that the party or parties hereby released do not consent to this release, admit no liability to the
undersigned or others, shall not be stopped or otherwise barred from asserting and expressly reserve the right to assert any claim or
cause of action such party or'parties may have against the undersigned or others.
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive and that
recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making the Release, it is understood and agree, that the undersigned relies wholly
upon the undersigned's judgement, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability therefore
and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or pa/ties hereby released or their representative or by
any physician or surgeon by them employed.
The undersigned further declares and represents that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made
to the undersigned, and that this Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of this Release
are contractual and not a mere recital.

THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.
Signed, sealed and delivered this
Witness

day of

j_

,19.

____

Witness
Witness
STATE OF

S.S.

COUNTY OF
On the

day of

19

before me personally appeared

to me known to be the person(s) named herein and who executed the foregoing Release and m
has (have) read the foregoing releasee and understand(s) the contents thereof and that

acknowledged to me that
__ voluntarily executed the

same.
My term expires
Notary Public
A r

FN PH
t
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j;' \

6JUM 7 FH 5 CI
kc: ,.

Stephen J. Trayner, #4928
Kenneth W. Maxwell, #6609
STRONG &HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080
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DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BONNIE THORNOCK,

]

Plaintiff,

])
)
]
>
]
)
]

vs.
DOROTHY JENSEN,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF JIM LANCASTER
Civil No. 960901305-PI
Judge David S. Young

I, Jim Lancaster, having been sworn upon oath, depose and testify as follows:
1.

This affidavits supplements my prior testimony as recorded in Affidavit of Jim

Lancaster, executed on April 18, 1996.
2.

Dorothy Jensen was involved in an automobile accident with Bonnie Thornock.

Dorothy Jensen's husband, Lowell Jensen, was not involved in the automobile accident.

0 00 «> o

3.

The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured by an insurance policy

issued by Windsor Insurance Group ("Windsor") under her husband's name, Lowell Jensen.
4.

On November 30, 1993, I met with Bonnie Thornock to discuss settlement of her

claims arising out of the automobile accident with Dorothy Jensen.

I explained to Bonnie

Thornock that I worked for Windsor, the insurance company which covered Dorothy Jensen at
the time of the accident, and Windsor wanted to negotiate a settlement with respect to all claims
Bonnie Thornock might have against Dorothy Jensen.

Bonnie Thornock indicated that she

understood and that she wanted to settle her claims. We agreed to settle Bonnie Thornock's
claims against Dorothy Jensen for $469.00.
5.

Bonnie Thornock and I had a clear understanding that we were negotiating

regarding Bonnie Thornock's potential claims against Dorothy Jensen which arose out of the
accident which occurred at the intersection of "90th South & Redwood Rd., West Jordan, Ut."
6.

I filled out the Release of Claims ("Release") attached to my first affidavit as

Exhibit 1. I wrote Lowell Jensen's name on the Release because Lowell Jensen is the policy
holder.
7.

I discussed the terms of the Release with Bonnie Thornock. I explained that the

Release discharged all claims she might have against Dorothy Jensen which arose out of the
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accident. Bonnie Thornock indicated that she understood and signed the Release in my presence
and accepted the settlement check.
DATED this 7th day of June, 1996.

Lancaster
Subscribed and sworn before me on this 7th day of June, 1996.
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Notary Pi
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 7^

day of June 1996, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Albert W. Gray
Robert J. Debry & Associates
3575 South Market Street, #206
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

a0 (\ a ;: ;k "

CM

r

'• G jLvi 20 pfj

ALBERT W. GRAY - A6095
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3575 South Market Street, #206
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Telephone:
(801) 966-8111
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BONNIE THORNOCK,

I AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE THORNOCK

Plaintiff,
vs.
DOROTHY JENSEN,

]
)
]

Civil No. 960901305PI
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Bonnie Thornock, having been sworn upon oath, depose and
testify as follows:
1.

That I am the plaintiff in this action and was involved

in a motor vehicle collision with defendant Dorothy Jensen on
November 17, 1993.
2.

That I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in

this affidavit.
3.

That in November 1993, after the accident with Dorothy

Jensen, Jim Lancaster came to my home and offered me $469.00 to pay
for my eyeglasses and work that I had missed.
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4.

That at the time Mr. Lancaster offered me the money, he

stated that it was only for the eyeglasses and missed work and at
no time did he tell me I was releasing all claims.

Otherwise I

would not of signed any papers•
5.

That I never intended to release anyone, especially the

negligent driver, defendant Dorothy Jensen.
6.

At the time that I was presented with the "release," as

claimed by Mr. Lancaster, it was entirely blank piece of paper.
7.

At the time Mr. Lancaster visited me at my home and had

me sign that paper, I was under treatment for my injuries and under
pain medication.

I simply took Mr. Lancaster, at his word, that I

was signing only for the glasses and work lost up until that time.
Mr. Lancaster pointed with his finger where I should sign on the
blank piece of paper.
DATED this

/^

day of June, 1996.

By
BOtfNIE THORNOCK
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this
June, 1996.

kitiin J
NOTARY PUBLIC
RESIDING IN:

IX

day of

'.tMMs

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBUC
KAREN I. MURRAY
3S7S S Mark* St #206
WestVafi«y,tJT84ii9
My Commission Expires
June 1.1997
STATE OF UTAH
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE THORNOCK
postage prepaid, this

^^"^

(Thornock v. Jensen) was mailed,
day of June, 1996, to the following:

Stephen J, Trayner
STRONG & HANNI
#9 Exchange Place
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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WV645.007
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF (Thornock v. Jensen) was
mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of March,

1997, addressed to the following:
Nancy Mismash
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
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